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DDG 1000 VS. DDG 51: 







 The research presented is a comparative analysis of DDG 51 and DDG 1000 
Destroyer programs in terms of acquisition strategy, cost structure and capability.  The 
DDG 51 is arguably the most successful surface ship program in modern U.S. Navy 
history with sixty-two ships purchased between FY 1985 to FY 2005.  DDG 51’s success 
can be attributed to excellence in multiple warfare areas, predictable cost structure and 
the use proven technologies that were incrementally upgraded.  The DDG 1000 has been 
in development since the mid 1990s and has been the subject of harsh criticism due to 
cost overruns and the slow maturation of critical technologies.   
 Recently, despite years of support from Navy shipbuilding officials, the Chief of 
Naval Operations requested that the DDG 1000 program be truncated to two ships in 
order to clear the way for the purchase of eight additional DDG 51s between FY 2010 
and FY 2015.  The Navy based its reasoning primarily on emerging threats that the DDG 
1000 was not able to deter. 
   The research supports the Navy’s recommendation to truncate the DDG 1000 
program at two ships and reopen DDG 51 production lines.  The DDG 51’s versatility 
and established cost structure brings the Navy closer to its goal of 313 ships while 
ensuring the ability to counter emerging threats.  The DDG 1000, despite its impressive 
new technologies, simply did not add enough capability to warrant its excessive cost 
growth.  The DDG 1000 program, however, was not a waste of time or money.  The 
DDG 1000 will provide the Navy with increased capability in the littorals and serve as a 
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A. EVOLVING ROLE OF THE MODERN SURFACE COMBATANT 
 The roles and identities of surface combatants changed dramatically following 
World War II.  As the battleship era ended and the aircraft carrier took its place as the 
primary maritime power projection platform, there were essentially three types of surface 
combatants remaining in the U.S. Navy – Cruisers, Destroyers and Frigates.  Cruisers 
were essentially light battleships equipped with medium sized guns ranging from six to 
ten inches.  Destroyers were smaller escort ships equipped with five-inch, anti-aircraft 
guns and an assortment of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) weapons including torpedoes 
and depth charges.  Frigates were even smaller than Destroyers, also used primarily for 
escort duty.  Cruisers and Destroyers had two primary missions – ASW and anti-air 
warfare (AAW).  Some classes only focused on one mission.  Secondary missions 
included anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and naval surface fire support (NSFS) for 
amphibious operations.1 
 The emergence of the cruise missiles in the 1970s blurred the distinction between 
Cruisers and Destroyers.  Guns became less relevant on these vessels and missiles 
became the primary weapon.  Three major systems developed by the U.S. Navy in the 
1980s significantly changed the modern surface force – the Tomahawk cruise missile, the 
vertical launch system (VLS) and the Aegis Combat System.  The Tomahawk cruise 
missile gave surface combatants the capability to deliver a 1,000-pound warhead with 
precision accuracy at distances greater than 1,000 miles.  The VLS allowed surface ships 
to carry a variety of offensive and defensive missiles, and launch them with 
unprecedented rates of fire.  The Aegis Weapon System – an integrated combat system 
centered on the AN/SPY-1 phased-array radar – gave ships the ability to track multiple 
targets at 250 nautical miles and engage them simultaneously at distances up to 80 
                                                 
1 R. O’Rourke, “Navy DD(X) and LCS Ship Acquisition Programs:  Oversight Issues and Options for 
Congress,” (2004), Congressional Research Service:  The Library of Congress, 3. 
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nautical miles.   The modern surface vessel evolved from the escort ships of WWII into 
modern, technology-filled ships with the ability to pack an offensive punch.2 
B. U.S. NAVY SURFACE COMBATANTS TODAY 
Today, the U.S. Navy has two main operational classes of guided missile surface 
combatants: 
• CG 47 class Cruiser (Ticonderoga Class) 
• DDG 51 Destroyer (Arleigh Burke Class) 
The CG 47 Cruiser is 567 feet long and displaces roughly 9,700 tons.  It is 
equipped with the Aegis combat system and VLS capable of firing Tomahawk cruise 
missiles, SM2 surface-air-missiles, and antisubmarine rockets (ASROC).  The U.S. Navy 
purchased 27 of these ships from fiscal year FY 1978 to FY 1988.  The five ships that do 
not have VLS or Tomahawk capabilities have been decommissioned.  The Navy plans to 
modernize the remaining 22 ships and keep them in service until 2025.3 
The DDG 51 Destroyers are 505 feet long and displace roughly 9,500 tons.  All 
versions are equipped with the Aegis Combat System and VLS similar to the CG 47 class 
ships.  DDG 51 class hulls 51 to 78 are considered Flight I and Flight II ships.  Hulls 79 
and above are considered Flight IIA ships with the primary distinction being a fully 
functioning hangar for Light Airborne Multi-purpose System (LAMPS) III aircraft.  The 
U.S. Navy currently has firm plans to produce 62 of these ships and is currently 
requesting to procure an additional eight.  Proven and versatile, the DDG 51 destroyers 
are the backbone of the modern surface fleet.4 
C. DDG 1000 VS DDG 51 – WHERE WE STAND TODAY 
On July 31, 2008, VADM Barry McCullough, Deputy CNO for Integration of 
Capabilities and Resources (N8), and Ms. Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
                                                 
2 R. O’Rourke (2004), 3. 





the Navy (Ship Programs), testified before the House Armed Service Seapower 
Subcommittee.  In their testimony, the Navy stated its desire to truncate the DDG 1000 
destroyer program at two ships and instead continue to procure DDG 51 destroyers.5  The 
DDG 1000 program, which began in the early 1990s, was primarily a land attack 
destroyer that focused on projecting combat power ashore from the shallow littoral 
regions of the ocean.  In contrast, the older DDG 51 focused more on traditional, open 
ocean combat power. 
In their testimony, the Navy cited new threats such as ballistic missiles, cruise 
missiles and submarines and stated that the DDG 51 was more capable of defeating those 
threats.6    This was a dramatic shift in position.  For years the Navy strongly supported 
the DDG 1000 program despite large cost overruns.  They emphasized the DDG 1000’s 
projected smaller crew size, lower fuel costs and significantly improved capability in the 
littorals.  Now, the Navy stated that the DDG 51, a vessel designed in the 1970s and 
procured throughout the 80s and 90s was better suited for emerging threats.  
The Navy’s shift in position was influenced by more than these new threat 
assessments.  The DDG 51 is a proven and versatile ship with a predictable cost structure.  
The DDG 1000 program has significant capability upgrades, but also has the risk of 
significant cost growth due to maturing technologies.  In addition, in an era that might see 
shrinking defense budgets, the DDG 51 will give the Navy a clearer path to its long term 
goal of 313 ships.  This research will analyze these two destroyer programs and compare 
their acquisition strategies, cost structures and capabilities.  The research will also show 
how the Navy’s shift in procurement strategy affects the future of the surface force. 
                                                 
5 R. O’Rourke (2004), 31. 














THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 5
II. EVOLUTION OF THE DDG 51 
A. DDG 51 CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT 
 The DDG 51 was named after the United States Navy’s most famous destroyer 
squadron commander and three-time Chief of Naval Operations – Admiral Arleigh 
Burke.  The first ship of the class was procured in FY 1985 and was commissioned July 
4, 1991.  The objective of the DDG 51 program was to develop a surface combatant to 
replace older Destroyers and Cruisers that were projected to retire in the 1990s.  The 
DDG 51 was designed to be a cheaper and simpler version of the CG 47 Cruiser.  Its 
original mission was to complement the CG 47 in blue water defense of Aircraft Carrier 
Battle groups and to conduct AAW and ASW operations against Soviet threats.7  
From FY 1985 to FY 2005, the Navy purchased 62 DDG 51s making it arguably 
the most successful acquisition of surface combatants in modern US Navy history.8  
There are several reasons why the DDG 51 program has been so successful.  One, the 
DDG 51 is an incredibly versatile platform. It excels in every area of Naval Warfare 
including AAW, ASW, ASuW, precision strike and NSFS.   Two, the DDG 51 design 
consisted mainly of incremental design improvements from the CG 47.  It was built with 
mostly proven technologies, and the newer technologies had manageable risk.  Three, the 
DDG 51s were incrementally upgraded as subsequent vessels in the class were built.  The 
upgrades took the form of three distinct flights and eight different combat systems 
baselines.9  This allowed the class to improve as technology progressed and new needs 
were recognized.  In addition, the lack of significant technological risk and incremental 
improvements allowed the DDG 51 to maintain a predictable and affordable cost 
structure throughout its twenty-year procurement cycle.10 
                                                 
7 J. F. Schank, et al., “Acquisition and Competition Strategy Options for the DD(X):  The Navy’s 21st 
Century Destroyer,” (2006) Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute,74. 
8 Ibid., 73. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 74, 85. 
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B. LOW TECHNOLOGICAL RISK – USE OF PROVEN TECHNOLOGIES 
The DDG 51 is very similar in design and capability to the CG 47.  They both 
feature the Aegis Combat System – making them premiere AAW platforms.  They both 
have twin screw, gas turbine propulsion plants with four LM2500 Main Engines.  This 
engineering plant gives both vessels a maximum speed in excess of 30 knots.  They both 
have three Gas Turbine Generators that supply roughly 2.5 megawatts (MW) of 
electricity.  In addition, they both have VLS systems with the ability to launch SM2, 
ASROC and Tomahawk missiles.11  Physically, the DDG 51s have a slightly shorter 
length, wider beam, lower mast height and smaller displacement than the CG 47s.   
There are some areas in which the CG 47 has slightly better capability than the 
DDG 51.  This is true because the DDG 51 was designed to complement, not replace the 
CG 47.  The DDG 51 has 96 VLS cells, while the CG 47 has 128 (this number is 
decreased slightly by the presence of a missile crane).  The DDG 51 also has only one 5 
inch Dual Purpose gun rather than two on the CG 47.   The CG 47s, designed to be Force 
AAW assets, also have increased command and control capability, additional fire control 
channels and spaces for embarked staff.  The most significant difference in capability 
between the original DDG 51s and the CG 47 class is the presence of a helicopter hangar 
on the CG 47s.  DDG 51s were designed to operate closely with large battle groups, 
where ships with hangars would always be in close proximity.  So, to save space, DDG 
51s were originally designed without a hangar but retained the ability to land and refuel 
helicopters.12 
There are many ways in which DDG 51s are more capable than CG 47s.  The 
most significant improvements are features that make the ship more survivable.  DDG 
51s have steel superstructures, rather than aluminum found on the CG 47.  DDG 51s also 
have over 100 tons of Kevlar armor for vital spaces while the CG 47 has almost no armor 
protection at all.   DDG 51s have a comprehensive Chemical, Biological, Radiological 
and Nuclear Defense (CBRN) system.  The DDG 51s also have improved noise and 
                                                 
11 Global security.org website. 
12 Schank, 84. 
 7
infrared suppression systems and a significantly reduced radar cross section – making 
them less vulnerable to torpedoes and cruise missiles.13  
C. INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS – THREE DISTINCT FLIGHTS 
The first major upgrade was the DDG 51 Flight II, which began with hull 72.  
This flight mainly includes improved communications gear, such as the SLQ-32 (V3) 
with active jamming capability, a Shipboard Signal Exploitation Space (SSES) and the 
capability to launch the SM2 Block IV Extended Range Missile.14  Then, as the Cold 
War came to a close, and smaller threats emerged in more remote areas of the globe, the 
DDG 51 started to operate independently more often than originally planned.  This fact 
made the lack of a helicopter hangar a major drawback in the DDG 51s capability.  This 
led to the most updated Flight of the DDG 51 - Flight IIA.  Flight IIA includes a fully 
functioning helicopter hangar for SH-60 LAMPS III aircraft.  This upgrade required the 
removal of the Tactical Towed Array Sonar System (TACTASS).  Additionally, CIWS 
mounts were removed on some hulls and replaced with the NATO Evolved Sea Sparrow 
Missile (ESSM).15 The three distinct Flights are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.   DDG 51-Class Flights. 
 
In addition to the three distinct Flights, the Aegis Combat System has been 
updated eight times.  These updates take the form of four major baselines of Aegis – 
baseline 5, 6 and 7.  Baseline 4 was the original Aegis baseline on hulls 51 - 67.  Baseline 
5 added the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) - an advanced 
                                                 
13 Schank, 74. 
14 Global security.org website. 
15 Ibid. 
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TDMA data link.  Baseline 6 added Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), which 
allowed units to share fire control quality data.  The most recent upgrade, Baseline 7, 
includes advanced computer architecture and is increasingly software intensive.16 
Another capability that has been incrementally added to the DDG 51 class is 
Ballistic Missile Defense Capability (BMD).  From 2004 through 2008, 15 DDG 51s 
have been modified for the BMD mission.  These modifications include new software for 
the Aegis Combat System, an advanced signal processor, and the SM3 interceptor 
missile.17  
D. PREDICTABLE COST STRUCTURE 
One of the greatest strengths of the DDG 51 program is that despite multiple 




Table 2.   DDG 51-Class Shipbuilding Costs per Unit (from RAND) 
 
                                                 




Table 3.   DDG 51-Class Shipbuilding Costs per Unit (FY 1998-2004 President’s Budget) 
As the graph above demonstrates, the first DDG 51 class ship was fairly 
expensive, but the costs for the second and subsequent ships were significantly lower and 
fairly predictable.  There are several reasons for this predictable cost structure.  One, as 
previously mentioned, the DDG 51 incorporated only a few new technologies and 
primarily depended on proven technologies.18  Two, the Navy used significant post 
commissioning testing on the first ship of the class to limit future cost growth.  Third, the 
large size of the class allowed the shipyards to learn as they built an increasing number of 
ships.  Lastly, the Navy used contracting policies that encouraged competition between 
the two shipyards – resulting in lower costs. 
Developing technologies are the most unpredictable cost factor in ship 
procurement. Traditionally, new platforms try to have no more than 4 major emerging 
technologies, in order to limit research and development costs.19  DDG 51 used pre-
existing technologies in many of the weapons systems such as the Aegis Combat System, 
VLS, Dual Purpose gun, and the Gas Turbine Engineering plant.  The additional costs of 
the first DDG 51 were incurred through the development of a new hull, and integration of 
the new combat systems suite – both of which decreased significantly over time.20 
                                                 
18 Schank, 74. 
19 Congressional Budget Office Paper (June 9, 2008), 20-28. 
20 RAND Corporation., 75-77. 
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 A significant amount of cost growth was avoided by the Navy through its 
relationship with industry from the preliminary design work through post commissioning 
testing.  The Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force, was heavily involved 
in the initial phases of testing.  New systems were tested by fleet sailors stationed ashore 
at industrial test facilities.  The combat system testing took place at the Combat System 
Engineering Development Site in Moorestown, New Jersey.  The propulsion plant testing 
took place at the Gas Turbine Ship Land-Based Engineering Site in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania.  
After DDG 51 was commissioned, the ship underwent extensive sea trials by the 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA).  A major Combat Systems Ship Qualification 
Trial (CSSQT) was conducted to test the newly integrated Combat Systems suite.  During 
CSSQT, the ship transitioned from an industrial to an operational environment and the 
ship’s crew worked alongside the shipyard technicians to learn how to operate and 
maintain the Combat Systems.  The extensive testing allowed industry to learn from its 
mistakes.  
Traditionally, the first ship of any class is more expensive than the subsequent 
ships.  This is due to the learning curve theory, which states that the production of each 
successive unit, the production process becomes more efficient.  A shipyard may not 
become completely proficient at building a ship until the second or third ship of the class 
is completed.  This was especially true with DDG 51.  The shipbuilding industry 
perfected the building of the DDG 51 class out of repetition.  Also, advances in combat 
system capabilities may have paralleled the cost reductions in the computer industry, 
thereby allowing significant improvements in capability while holding costs fairly 
constant over time.  
In addition, the Navy’s acquisition strategy for DDG 51 has contributed to cost 
stability while maintaining a solid industrial base.  Over the duration of the program, the 
DDG 51 Program Office has continued to change its contracting strategies to encourage 
competition between the two shipbuilding contractors in order to get the best price.  
There have been two primary methods used to foster competition.  The first is traditional 
price based competition.  The second is approach is competition based on profit known as 
 11
the Profit Related to Offer (PRO) strategy.  The two primary shipyards – Ingalls and Bath 
Iron Works (BIW) – have responded to the increased competition by producing 
increasingly capable ships over 20 years at a relatively stable cost per unit.21   
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III. EVOLUTION OF THE DDG 1000 CONCEPT 
A. DD 21 CONCEPT  
In the mid 1990s, the Navy began to focus on its next generation of surface 
combatants.  The first concept, initiated in 1994, was the DD 21 program.  The ship was 
initially envisioned as a land attack destroyer.  After the Cold War ended, senior Navy 
officials believed that in order to remain relevant, the U.S. Navy had to focus less on blue 
water supremacy and more on projecting power into the littorals and onto land.  Also, in 
the Persian Gulf War of 1991, four reactivated Iowa class Battleships performed 
brilliantly in the NSFS role. Although still effective over forty years after they were 
commissioned, these venerable warships could not be called upon forever and the U.S. 
Navy sought new solutions for projecting power ashore.22 
DD 21 was to be the first member of the SC 21 family of 21st century surface 
combatants.  Navy shipbuilding officials initially envisioned purchasing 32 DD 21s 
beginning in FY 2005.  The first ship was to enter service in 2010.  The initial plan was 
to purchase three ships per year to replace the DD 963 and FFG 7 ships that were in 
service at the time.   In FY 2015, the Navy planned to purchase CG 21 – a next 
generation cruiser based on the DD 21 design – to replace the CG 47 class of ships.  
Although the land attack mission inspired the ship class, the DD 21 was planned as a 
multi-mission ship.  It would retain traditional maritime dominance capabilities in ASW, 
AAW and ASuW.23   
DD 21 was to have a crew of 95 to 150 sailors, much smaller than the DDG 51 
with a crew size of 285 or the CG-47 with a crew of 350.  The Navy also announced that 
it would incorporate electric drive technologies in an effort to reduce operations and 
maintenance (O&M) costs.  The hull was to be a new wave-piercing tumblehome design 
intended to reduce radar, acoustic and infrared signatures.  It was to be equipped with 
VLS and two new 155mm Advanced Gun Systems (AGS) for long range, precision 
                                                 
22 R. O’Rourke (2004), 10. 
23 Ibid.  
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guided shells.  It was not to be fitted with an Aegis Combat System and thus would not 
have the AAW capabilities of the DDG 51 or CG 47 classes.  In order to allow a 
procurement rate of three ships per year, the Navy wanted DD 21 to have a unit 
procurement cost lower than the DDG 51.  The procurement cost of the first DD 21, 
which included Research and Development (R&D) costs was estimated at $2.03 billion  
in FY 1996 dollars.  The procurement cost of the fifth and following DD 21s was $750 
million in FY 1996 dollars.  These numbers would soon prove to be highly optimistic. 24 
B. DD(X) AND THE RUMSFELD PENTAGON 
After Donald Rumsfeld became Secretary of Defense in 2001, support for the DD 
21 decreased.  Rumsfeld tried to transition the U.S. Military into a smaller, faster, more 
technology driven fighting force.  Several DOD panels found that the DD 21 program 
was non-transformational, which ran against Rumsfeld’s thinking.  Also, in 
Congressional hearings for the 2002 proposed defense budget, Navy officials could not 
specifically state the merits of the program that were significant enough to outweigh its 
rising costs. 25  
By 2001, the vision for the ship drastically changed.  The design displacement 
increased to 16,000 tons – well higher than the 9,000-10,000 tons of DDG 51 class ships.  
This increase was due to the multiple war fighting requirements including two AGS 
systems, 128 VLS tubes, and a helicopter/unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capable 
hangar.  In addition, DOD officials were concerned about the risks of simultaneously 
implementing multiple unproven technologies in the same ship.  The consensus was that 
the DD 21 would not meet its unit procurement costs goals.  The program took another 
hit during the markup of the FY 2002 defense appropriation bill when the House 
Appropriations Committee significantly reduced the Navy’s request for R&D funding.  In 
November 2001, Navy acquisition officials announced that the DD 21 program was being 
replaced by the DD(X).26 
                                                 
24 R. O’Rourke (2004), 11. 
25 Ibid.,  13.  
26 Ibid., 11.  
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There were very few differences between DD(X) and DD 21.  DD(X) was slightly 
smaller, with a displacement of 14,000 tons.  VLS tubes were reduced to 80 and 
magazine size for the AGS was reduced to less than 600 rounds.  It was still designed to 
be a multi-mission destroyer with an emphasis on land attack.  New technologies 
included the previously mentioned tumblehome hull and integrated electric drive and 
several new technologies including a composite material hull, dual band radar and a total 
ship computing system for increased automation and crew size reduction. 27  
The Navy announced that it intended to procure 24 of these vessels through FY 
2017 and then begin procurement of a next generation cruiser – CG(X) in FY 2018.   The 
Navy estimated that the fifth and sixth DD(X) would have an average procurement cost 
of $1.2 billion to $1.4 billion.  The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that 
the entire 24 ship class built at a rate of two per year would have an average procurement 
cost of $1.8 billion in FY 2003 dollars.  Cost estimations were rising rapidly.28 
In May 2003, the Navy sent a report to Congress outlining its 30 year 
shipbuilding plan.  The report called for a 375 ship Navy with 24 DD(X) vessels.  A 
similar report sent to Congress in 2005 saw the plan revised to a fleet of 260 to 325 ships, 
including 8 to 12 DD(X) ships.  This startling change was brought on by tremendous cost 
growth in the DD(X) program between the President’s 2004 and 2006 budget.  In 2005, 
the CBO estimated that the lead ship in the DD(X) program would cost $3.3 billion.  
Estimations about historical relationships between lead ships and follow on ships gave 
the DD(X) an average cost of $2.4 billion.29  In two years, the Navy saw almost a 25 
percent cost growth – primarily due to the ships slowly maturing technologies.  The 2007 
cost estimates from the CBO over time for the fifth ship in the DD 21/DD(X) Program 




                                                 
27 R. O’Rourke (2004),  14. 
28 Ibid., 15. 
29 Congressional Budget Office Testimony (July 19, 2005), 1-2. 
 16
 Billions of 2007 Dollars 
1996 Objective goal (DD 21) 1.06 
2004 Future Years Defense Program 1.4 
2005 Navy Estimate 2.0 
2005 CBO Estimate 3.4 
Table 4.   Congressional Budget Office 2007 cost estimates for the fifth ship of the DD 
21/DD(X) Program30 
 
C. DDG 1000:  THE ZUMWALT PROGRAM TAKES SHAPE 
In April 2006, the program’s name changed again to DDG 1000.  It was given the 
name Zumwalt after Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the Navy’s visionary CNO from 1970-
1974.  This name change not only gave the Zumwalt class the name of its first vessel, but 
also added the “G” to its designation for the first time, indicating the ability to fire guided 
missiles.  The Navy’s new plan called for procuring seven of these ships from FY 2007 to 
FY 2013.  The first two ships of the class, DDG 1000 and DDG 1001 were authorized in 
the FY 2007 budget.31  The two ships would be built at competing shipyards, NGSB 
(Northrop Grumman) and BIW (General Dynamics subsidiary).  The contracts for 
construction of the first two ships were cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) contracts.32  The 








                                                 
30 CBO Testimony (July 19, 2005), 5. 
31 R. O’Rourke (2008), 2-3. 
32 Ibid., 29. 
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 FY 02 
thru 
FY06 
FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 TOTAL 
thru  
FY13 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Navy (RDTEN) account 
DDG1000 4549 756 493 449 521 565 326 174 7832 
Shipbuilding and Conversion Account (SCN) 
DDG1000  
DDG1001 
1010 2557 2757 0 0 0 0 0 6325 
DD/NRE* 994 893 0 0 0 0 0 0 1887 
Construction 16 1664 2757 0 0 0 0 0 4437 
DDG1002 0 0 150 2503 0 0 0 0 2653 
DDG1003 0 0 0 51 2663 0 0 0 2714 
DDG1004 0 0 0 0 51 2377 0 0 2428 
DDG1005 0 0 0 0 0 50 2569 0 2619 
DDG1006 0 0 0 0 0 0 50 2347 2397 
Outfitting/ 
Post Delivery 
0 0 0 0 16 61 87 132 295 
Subtotal SCN 1010 2557 2907 2554 2730 2488 2706 2479 19430 
TOTAL 5559 3313 3399 3003 3250 3053 3032 2653 27262 
* Detailed Design and Non recurring Engineering costs 
Table 5.   Proposed DDG 1000 Program Funding, FY2002-FY2013 (Millions of then year 
dollars, rounded to the nearest million – based on Navy data provided to the CRS 
on July 7, 2007 and May 8, 2008) 
 
D. DDG 1000 MISSION AND CAPABILITIES 
Despite the new DDG designation, the Navy never intended that these ships 
would replace the DDG 51 class of destroyers.  They claimed that these vessels would 
provide increased capability in the littoral regions - including land attack and shallow 
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water ASW.  The Navy also claimed that the DDG 1000 would be just as capable, if not 
more capable than current surface combatants in blue water operations.  The Navy 
briefing slides to Congress stated that DDG 1000 would carry the majority of the 
weapons that were carried on the DDG 51, included TLAM and SM2.  The presence of 
these weapons and the description of the ship’s sensors indicated that DDG 1000 was 
capable of traditional surface combatant missions such as Force AAW, blue water ASW 
and precision strike.  
The Navy also claimed that the ship would serve as a technology bridge to the 
next generation Cruiser or CG(X) that the Navy wanted to procure after FY 2013 to 
replace the CG 47 class.  There were a total of ten major developing technologies to be 
integrated into the    DDG 1000.  The Navy believed that by developing these 
technologies on the DDG 1000, they were taking a major leap forward in surface ship 
capability.  In addition, they believed that the fuel efficiencies and automation 
technologies would bring much needed future relief to the Navy’s personnel (MPN) and 
operating (O&M) spending accounts – both of which were trending upward rapidly.  The 
ten new technologies are listed below:  
• Advanced Gun System (AGS):  DDG 1000 will employ a battery of two 155mm 
AGSs, firing-rocket assisted Long-Range Land Attack Projectiles (LRLAP).  This 
will provide precision strikes at a range of up to 83 nautical miles.  This system is 
equivalent to twelve 155mm howitzers and will significantly improve current NSFS 
capabilities. 
• Automatic Fire Suppression System (AFSS):  This advanced, automated damage-
control system combines automated sensors and cameras to greatly enhance 
firefighting capabilities.  The system significantly reduces damage control manpower 
requirements. 
• Dual Band Radar (DBR):  The DBR integrates S-band and X-band radar 
capabilities in a single system. DBR is a multi-function radar, simultaneously 





• Integrated Composite Deckhouse and Aperture:  Constructed of rugged, 
lightweight composites, the angular deckhouse increases stealth capability by 
minimizing radar reflectance and by eliminating high-profile masts and rotating 
antennas. 
• Integrated Power System (IPS):  The IPS generates all the energy needed for 
propulsion, electronics, and combat systems.  IPS can produce six times more 
electrical power than the three 60 hertz Gas Turbine Generators on the DDG 51. 
• Integrated Undersea Warfare Suite (IUWS):  The IUSW incorporates two types of 
sonar arrays in one automated system.  The high frequency sonar provides mine 
avoidance capabilities, while the medium frequency sonar optimizes ASW operations 
in the littoral regions. 
• Mk 57 VLS:  This system can accommodate both existing and future missiles for 
land attack (TLAM), ASW (ASROC) and AAW (SM 2).  Its modular electronic 
architecture allows the DDG 1000 to easily accommodate new missile designs as 
technology progresses. 
• Peripheral Advanced VLS:  A system of armored compartments located around the 
periphery of the DDG 1000.  Each PVLS compartment contains and protects one 
MK57 Vertical Launching System.  This design makes launchers and missiles 
resistant to battle damage while safely isolating them from crew and equipment 
spaces. 
• Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE):  The TSCE is the first large-scale 
implementation of the U.S. Navy’s Open Architecture strategy.  Designed to bind all 
DDG 1000 systems together, the TSCE creates a shipboard enterprise network 
allowing seamless integration of all on-board systems. 
• Wave piercing tumblehome hull:  The tumblehome hull (inward sloping from the 
waterline)  minimizes the DDG 1000 radar cross section for enhanced stealth and 
survivability.  Driven by a quiet and efficient all-electric propulsion system, the hull 
design optimizes speed, maneuverability and stability while minimizing engine noise 
and infrared signatures.33 
                                                 
33 Raytheon Company website. 
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IV. DDG 1000 ACQUISITION RISKS AND INCREASED 
CONGRESSIONAL SCRUTINY 
A. SIGNIFICANT TECHNOLOGICAL RISK 
The large number of immature technologies represented a sharp contrast from 
modern Navy shipbuilding philosophy.  Never before had the Navy attempted to 
incorporate so many unproven technologies into one hull.  Also, the concept of a 
technology bridge was never introduced.  For example, when the DDG 51 was 
developed, the Navy used the Aegis Combat System that was previously tested on the CG 
47 class.  In fact, the DDG 51 hull, engineering plant and combat system represented 
small and systematic improvements in proven technologies from the CG 47.  In addition, 
as DDG 51 construction progressed through the years, existing technologies were 
improved on subsequent hull numbers.34  These changes also resulted in three distinct 
Flights of DDG 51 – Flight I, II, and IIA, all of which are incremental improvements 
from the previous flight. 
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released in March 2008 
highlighted the technological risks of the DDG 1000 program.  This report analyzed the 
current status of the developing technologies and questioned the Navy’s timeline.  The 
report found that only three of the critical technologies were fully mature and were tested 
in an at sea environment.  Seven technologies were not fully mature and five of them 
would not demonstrate full maturity until after installation on the ship.  Two of the 
technologies – the volume search radar and the total ship computing environment were 
still at low levels of maturity.  The land based testing for the volume search radar was not 
scheduled to begin until May 2008, a delay of 12 months.  It was also discovered that the 
Navy planned on completing only 85 percent of the ship’s detailed design prior to the 
start of construction - a very risky proposal.35 
                                                 
34 RAND Corporation (2006), 74-75. 
35 Government Accountability Office (March 2008), 69-70. 
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In addition, due to scheduling issues for the lead ships, the Navy did not have 
time to completely test the integrated power system prior to shipyard delivery.  The Navy 
planned on conducting integrated power system testing in 2010 at a land-based site.  The 
report noted that significant software development remained and if problems were 
discovered during testing, construction plans would be at significant risk because the 
power systems would have already been delivered to the shipyard.  The report also 
questioned the sea worthiness of the tumblehome hull design.  This type of hull has never 
been employed on a naval surface ship and the only methods that were used to test this 
hull were scale models and computer simulations.  The Navy claimed that testing was 
ongoing to develop guidance for operating the ship safely at various sea conditions.  In 
Summary, this report made it clear that the DDG 1000 program had significant 
technological risks.36 
B. SIGNIFICANT RISK OF COST GROWTH:  CONGRESS QUESTIONS 
THE  NAVY’S ABILITY TO ESTIMATE COST 
 The Congressional Budget Office made it clear in their June 2008 report that it 
believed the Navy was significantly underestimating DDG 1000 procurement costs.  The 
CBO believed that the first two DDG 1000s would cost approximately 56 percent more 
than Navy estimates and that the subsequent five ships would each cost approximately 64 
percent more than Navy estimates.  According to the report, the Navy’s 2009 budget 
suggested that the Navy expects the first two ships to cost $3.2 billion (FY 09 dollars) 
each and the subsequent five ships to cost $2.2 billion (FY 09 dollars) each.  This 
represented a cost increase of approximately $200 million per ship from the Navy’s 2008 
budget.  The CBO based its estimate on the lead ship cost of the DDG 51 class.  When 
adjusted for inflation, the first DDG 51 cost $390 million (FY 09 dollars) per thousand 
tons.  When this number is translated to the size of the larger DDG 1000, the CBO 
estimate put the first two ships at $5 billion each (FY 09 dollars) and the subsequent five 
at $3.6 billion (FY 09 dollars) each.37 
                                                 
36 Government Accountability Office (March 2008), 69-70. 
37 Congressional Budget Office Paper (June 9, 2008), 20-23.  
38 Congressional Budget Office Testimony (June 9, 2008), 20-23. 
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 This cost estimate startled Congress and lead to increased scrutiny about the cost 
of the DDG 1000 program.  The Navy argued that the CBO’s cost estimate was not valid 
because the DDG 51 had several problems in the early stages of construction that were 
not expected to occur with the DDG 1000.  In particular, the Navy pointed out that only 
20 percent of detailed design was complete on the DDG 51 before construction began, 
whereas 85 percent of detailed design was scheduled to be completed before construction 
of the first DDG 1000.  The CBO countered that while the Navy might not encounter the 
same problems as the DDG 51, it was likely to encounter unforeseen problems that most 
initial ships experience that would significantly increase cost.38 
 The CBO believed that it was necessary to include this uncertainty into cost 
estimations.  It specifically pointed to recent ship construction programs such as the 
Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), whose cost doubled, and the LPD 17, whose costs increased 
by 80 percent.  The report made it clear that if the previous two new classes of surface 
ships that were built experienced cost growth on such a high level, the DDG 1000 would 
be susceptible to cost growth on the same scale.  The CBO also said that the DDG 1000 
was incorporating ten major new technologies, whereas in the past the Navy typically 
only fielded three or four significant new technologies on new platforms.39   
 Finally, the CBO stated that if cost estimates on a relatively small and simple ship 
such as LCS were so off target, the Navy might have difficulty estimating the cost of 
larger combatants such as DDG 1000.  To make matters worse, in July 2007 the GAO 
testified that the Navy had assigned a confidence factor of 45 percent to their cost 
estimate – meaning there was a 55 percent chance that the cost of the DDG 1000 would 
exceed the Navy’s estimate.40   
C. DDG 1000 PROGRAM IS THREATENED 
By the summer of 2008, the DDG 1000 program was under intense fire on Capitol 
Hill.  A third DDG 1000 had already been requested in the FY 2009 budget, but rumors 
                                                 
39 Congressional Budget Office Testimony (June 9, 2008), 20-23. 
40 Government Accountability Office (July 24, 2007), 20-23. 
 
 24
of the program’s truncation swirled.  One harsh critic of the DDG 1000 program was 
Representative Gene Taylor (D-Miss), Chairman of the House Armed Services Seapower 
Subcommittee, whose district includes the Ingalls Shipyard in Pascagoula Mississippi.  
He was alarmed at the high cost of the program and didn’t believe that the DDG 1000 
brought enough additional capability to be worth the cost.  Taylor also did not believe 
that the cost of the DDG 1000 would allow the Navy to reach its goal of 313 ships.  He 
encouraged the Navy to instead build additional DDG 51s because of the ship’s proven 
performance and cost structure.  Members of Congress opposed to the cancellation of the 
DDG 1000 included Senators Susan Collins (R-Maine), and Olympia Snowe (R-Maine), 
whose state is home to BIW Shipyard, and Ted Kennedy (D-Mass), whose state is home 
to Raytheon, the primary combat systems contractor for the DDG 1000.41  
On July 31, 2008, VADM Barry McCullough, Deputy CNO for Integration of 
Capabilities and Resources (N8) and Ms. Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy (Ship Programs) appeared before the House Armed Services Seapower 
Subcommittee and made a stunning announcement.  VADM McCullough stated that the 
Navy now supported the truncation of the DDG 1000 program at two ships.  He testified 
that DDG 51’s cost structure would give the Navy a better chance to meet its long term 
goal of increasing the size of the fleet from its current level of 280 ships to 313 ships.42   
VADM McCullough stated that the Navy supported the reopening of DDG 51 
production lines.  The three DDG 51s procured in FY 2005 were intended to be the final 
ships in the program.  And budgets after FY 2006 included funds to close out the 
program.43  This was a remarkable reversal.  For years, Navy officials defended the DDG 
1000 program against criticism and rejected a continuation of the DDG 51 program.  
Since 2005, CNOs Admiral Mike Mullen and Admiral Gary Roughead had consistently 
supported the DDG 1000, indicating that they wanted to take a step forward, not a step 
backwards. 
                                                 
41 C. P. Cavas, “DDG 1000 Program Facing Major Cuts,” (July 14, 2008). 




D. THE NAVY CHANGES ITS POSITION – CITES NEW THREAT 
ASSESSMENT 
In his testimony, VADM McCullough reaffirmed the Navy’s desire to truncate the 
DDG 1000 program at two ships and to procure an additional eight DDG 51s from FY 
2010 to FY 2015.  He also expressed the Navy’s desire that the third DDG 1000 – already 
submitted as a part of the FY 2009 Budget, now be replaced with a DDG 51.  This would 
lead to a total of nine additional DDG 51s.  Interestingly, the Navy’s new position on the 
FY 2009 budget was not included in the Navy’s request to OSD because by law, they are 
required to defend their original position while the budget is being considered by 
Congress.44  VADM McCullough made it clear that the Navy remained ready to execute 
construction of a third DDG 1000 if it was funded as originally requested, but that the 
Navy now preferred an additional DDG 51.45 
VADM McCullough testified that it changed its position on destroyer 
procurement because of a recent change in threat assessment.  They stated that over the 
previous two years the threat of ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) and 
modern non-nuclear powered submarines operating in blue waters has increased.  VADM 
McCullough also testified that as a result of this threat assessment, the Navy needed to 
increase its AAW, BMD and blue water ASW capability through the purchase of 
additional DDG 51s.  VADM McCullough stated that the Navy believed that it currently 
had enough capacity to support forces ashore with precision guided munitions and 
Tomahawk cruise missiles.  Finally, he testified that the DDG 1000 was well suited for 
NSFS and ASW operations in littoral waters but was not capable of effective AAW, 
BMD or blue water ASW operations.46 
Perhaps the most shocking portion of the testimony concerned the DDG 1000’s 
AAW capability.  For years, the Navy briefing slides indicated that DDG 1000 was able 
to carry the SM2.   VADM McCullough now testified that that DDG 1000 was unable to 
carry this weapon and thus would not be able to carry out the area AAW mission.  
                                                 
44 R. O’Rourke (October 22, 2008), 7-8. 
45 Navy Testimony before HAS Seapower Subcommittee (July 31, 2008). 
46 Ibid.  
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Instead, he testified that the DDG 1000’s AAW capability would be limited to short 
range, point defense.  In addition, he stated that the DDG 1000 was not capable of 
fielding the SM3 missile for BMD missions.47   
This testimony stunned members of the Seapower committee.  They not only 
expressed disappointment at the DDG 1000’s perceived lack of capability, but they also 
pressed VADM McCullough for the specific threats that warranted this shift in position.  
VADM McCullough stated that these threats were classified and that he would not be 
able to discuss them in the current setting.  It was later revealed in Defense News 
Magazine that the threat discussed was possibly a derivative of the Chinese Dong Feng 
21/CSS-5 Ballistic Missile.  In addition to developing highly sophisticated ASCMs, 
Defense News stated that the Chinese were developing ballistic missiles with 
independently guided re-entry vehicles capable of hitting carrier strike groups at sea at 
great standoff distances.  According to the article, The Navy saw this as a way for the 
Chinese to counter U.S. Navy power projection capabilities in the Western Pacific. In 
order to counter this threat, the article argued that the Navy believed it needed additional 
AAW and BMD capacity – an area in which the cheaper and proven DDG 51 excelled.48 
 In addition to the lack of AAW capability, VADM McCullough also testified that 
the sonar on DDG 1000 was not ideal for tracking modern non nuclear submarines in 
blue water environments.  He also stated that China, North Korea and Iran were 
developing increased blue water submarine capability and that the DDG 51 was better 
equipped for that mission.49  In essence, VADM McCullough testified that the $3 billion 
plus per copy DDG 1000, a program the US Navy developed and fiercely defended for 
more than ten years, excelled in little else than land attack operations and shallow water 
ASW.   
 Although not mentioned in detail in VADM McCullough’s testimony, it is 
believed that cost overruns had a significant impact on the Navy’s recommendation. 
Analysts agree that the Defense Budget is not likely to see significant growth, and might 
                                                 
47 R. O’Rourke (October 22, 2008), 7-8. 
48 C. P. Cavas (August 4, 2008). 
49 Navy Testimony before HAS Seapower Subcommittee (July 31, 2008). 
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possibly see reductions in the coming years.  The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 
expensive rescue of the American financial sector, the growing national debt and the 
uncertainty of a new administration in the White House contribute to this belief.  It is 
possible that Navy officials recognized this truth and abandoned an expensive acquisition 
program in favor of a less expensive, proven program that brings them closer to their goal 
of 313 ships. 
E. DDG 1000 TODAY 
The final version of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act signed by 
President Bush in September, 2008 includes partial funding of $1.5 Billion for a third 
DDG 1000.50  This position was pushed by the previously mentioned New England 
Congressmen in order to maintain a stable industrial base in their states.  It is now almost 
certain that the DDG 1000 program will be no greater than three ships, and that the final 
number might actually be two because the additional FY 2009 funds might be allocated 
for cost overruns on the first two ships.  In addition, the 2009 Defense Authorization Act 
includes $350 million in funding for DDG 51 spare parts and for a possible reopening of 
DDG 51 production lines at BIW and Ingalls.  On September 26, 2008, the CNO made it 
clear that Navy stands by its stated position at the July 31 Hearing of procuring an 
additional eight DDG 51s from FY 2010 to FY 2015.51  It is unknown whether the newly 
procured DDG 51s will be Flight IIAs or possibly a newer flight with more incremental 
upgrades. 
                                                 
50 C. P. Cavas, “DDG 1000 Takes Another Hit – From JROC,” (October 6, 2008) 
51 Ibid.  
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V. DDG 1000 VS. DDG 51. A SIDE-BY SIDE COMPARISON 
A. CAPABILITY  
 
• Size:  The DDG 1000 is considerably larger than the DDG 51.  It is longer 
(600 ft vs. 505 ft), wider (80.7 ft vs. 62 ft) and heavier (16,000 tons vs. 
9,500 tons).  The DDG 1000 does have a shallower draft than the DDG 51 
(31 ft vs. 27.6 ft), giving it increased ability to operate in littoral regions.52 
• Mobility:  The DDG 1000 and DDG 51 are roughly equal in terms of 
maximum speed (30+ knots) and range.  And according to Navy briefings 
to CRS, the DDG 1000 and DDG 51 are roughly equal in terms of 
seaworthiness.  There have been questions, however, about the 
seaworthiness of the tumblehome hull on the DDG 1000.  A hull of this 
type has never been built on this large a scale and as of late 2008 only 
scale models have been tested. 53 
• Electrical Power:  The DDG 51 has three Gas Turbine Generators that 
can produce 7.5 MW of electrical power.  The IPS on the DDG 1000 can 
produce 78 MW of electrical power.  This allows the DDG 1000 to 
accommodate more robust weapons and systems and allow for possible 
future technological upgrades.54 
• Signatures and Detectability:  The DDG 1000 has a smaller radar cross 
section and lower acoustic, infrared, and magnetic signatures than the 
DDG 51.  The improvements in radar cross section are made possible by 
the tumblehome hull and integrated deck house.  The improvements in 
acoustic signature are made possible by the IPS. 55 
                                                 
52 Navy briefing to CRS (June 10, 2005). 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid. 
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• Survivability and Damage Control:  The DDG 1000 and DDG 51 are 
roughly equal in terms of ship stability when flooded.  The DDG 1000, 
however, has an automatic flood control system which the Navy believes 
will be more effective at keeping damaged ships afloat.  The DDG 1000 
also has an automatic fire suppression system throughout the ship, while 
the DDG 51’s system is only automatic in the magazines, engineering 
spaces and other select spaces.  The DDG 1000’s electrical system also 
has “integrated fight-through” capability that automatically isolates 
damaged areas and reroutes power around them.  In addition, all DDG 
1000 systems are dual fed in case primary power is cut off.  The DDG 51 
does not have these electrical features.56 
• C4I / Networking Bandwidth:  The C4I and networking systems on the 
DDG 1000 have five times the bandwidth as DDG 51 systems.  This not 
only gives the DDG 1000 improved warfighting capability, but also makes 
distance support easier which has the potential to improve at sea 
maintenance.  Also, better at sea internet access has the capability to 
greatly improve morale.57 
• AAW/BMD:  The DDG 1000 combat system will be able to handle 10 
times the amount of tracks as the DDG 51’s current Aegis Combat 
System.  The Dual Band Radar on DDG 1000 is roughly equivalent to the 
DDG 51’s SPY-1D radar in terms of sensitivity, but it reportedly has a 25 
percent longer firm track range (i.e., it can detect targets and generate fire 
control quality tracks at longer ranges).  In addition, the DDG 1000’s DBR 
will be more capable of deciphering “clutter” at the sea/land interface and 
will thus be more capable of littoral operations.  The SPY-1D radar 
struggles in this area and is better suited for blue water operations.58 
                                                 
56 Navy briefing to CRS (June 10, 2005). 
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid. 
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o Originally, it was believed that the DDG 1000 would employ the 
SM 2 missile and be capable of the area AAW mission.  Confusion 
in this area persists, but according to VADM McCullough’s recent 
testimony, the DDG 1000 can not employ the SM 2 and will only 
be capable of point defense AAW.  This is puzzling because 
Raytheon, the lead combat systems contractor for the DDG 1000, 
manufactures the SM 2.  The problem, however, might be the 
missile uplink technology that requires SM 2 to communicate in 
flight with the Aegis Combat System through the SPY radar.  The 
DDG 1000 combat system may not be able to perform this 
essential task. 
o In addition, the DDG 1000 will reportedly not be able to field the 
SM 3, giving it zero BMD capability.  The inability of DDG 1000 
to employ these two missiles gives a tremendous capability edge to 
the DDG 51, especially given the Navy’s new threat assessments.59 
• Naval Surface Fire Support:  The DDG 1000 has a tremendous 
capability edge in NSFS.  The DDG 51 has one 5-inch gun, while the 
DDG 1000 has two 155mm AGSs.  The DDG 51’s gun can fire a shell 
with 8 pounds of high explosive over 10 miles.  The DDG 1000 AGS can 
fire a shell with 24 lbs of high explosive over 60 miles.  The DDG 51 can 
fire an initial salvo of 20 rounds per minute, followed by a sustained salve 
of four rounds per minute.  The DDG 1000’s two guns have a combined 
firing rate of 20 rounds per minute that can be sustained until its 600 round 
magazine is depleted.60 
• Anti Submarine Warfare:  The sonar system on the DDG 51 is more 
suitable for blue water operations while the sonar system on the DDG 
1000 is more suitable for littoral operations.  The DDG 1000 sonar suite 
                                                 




will include a bow mounted sonar and a towed array sonar.  The DDG 
Flight IIA does not have a towed array sonar.  A towed array sonar is 
exclusively passive, and is especially helpful because it allows the ship to 
search at various water depths that have unique sound propagation paths 
because of differences in temperature, pressure and salinity. 
o Both the DDG 51 and DDG 1000 can fire the VLA anti-submarine 
rocket.  The DDG 51 has six 12.75 inch torpedo tubes for firing 
lightweight torpedoes, but this provides little ASW lethality 
against modern threats.  Both ships would use the same SLQ-25 
NIXIE countermeasures to confuse enemy torpedoes, but it is 
believed that these would work better on DDG 1000 because of its 
quieter sound signature.61 
• Aviation:  All DDG 51s can launch, land and refuel helicopters.  DDG 
Flight IIAs have a hangar to embark two SH-60 LAMPS helicopters.  
DDG 51s do not have the capability to launch UAVs.  The DDG 1000 can 
embark two SH-60 helicopters, or one SH-60 helicopter and three UAVs.  
The DDG 1000’s flight deck is larger than the DDG 51’s, giving it the 
ability to handle larger aircraft like the MV-22 and CH-53.  Its flight deck 
is also higher above the waterline, giving it the ability to conduct flight 
operations in rougher sea states.62 
 
B. COMPARATIVE COSTS 
Original supporters of the DDG 1000 believed that despite its high construction 
costs, the DDG 1000 will have lower operating costs than the DDG 51 because of its 
smaller crew.   Some even argued in the early stages of the program that the DDG 1000 
might have a lower life cycle cost than the DDG 51.  The CBO conducted a life cycle 
cost analysis for the DDG 1000 and DDG 51 programs in July of 2005 (all numbers 
below are in FY 2007 dollars).  
                                                 
61 Navy briefing to CRS (June 10, 2005). 
62 Ibid. 
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 In 2005, the CBO estimated the average procurement cost for a 10 ship DDG 
1000 class would be approximately $3.5 billion per copy, with the initial ship costing 
$4.7 billion.  The CBO also estimated that buying one DDG 51 per year would cost 
roughly $1.8 billion per copy and that buying two per year would cost $1.4 billion per 
copy.  Annual operating costs for a DDG 51 were estimated at $34 million based on 
historical Navy data.  Annual operating costs for the DDG 1000 were estimated at 
roughly $32 million based on a 60 percent smaller crew and a 55 percent higher full load 
displacement.  CBO then calculated total life cycle cost on a discounted Net Present 
Value basis over the ship’s thirty-five year lifespan.  According to their results shown in 
the table below, the operating cost savings of the DDG 1000 are not high enough to offset 
even the most optimistic procurement cost estimates. 
 
Table 6.   Life Cycle Cost Comparison of the DDG 51 and DDG 1000 Destroyer 
(All numbers in billions of 2007 dollars) * A major CBO assumption, disputed by the 
Navy, was that the lead DDG 1000 would cost at least as much as the lead DDG 51 on a 
per ton basis. 
 DDG 51 DDG 1000 
Procurement cost for lead ship of the class 
 Navy Estimate 







Full load Displacement (Thousands of long tons) 
 
8.3 14.3 










Annual Operating Costs 34 M 32 M 










The question of comparing procurement costs and operating costs appeared again in 
the spring of 2008, when the DDG 1000 program was in danger on Capitol Hill.  On May 7, 
2008, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead responded to a letter from Senator 
Kennedy requesting information on the capabilities and costs of both destroyer programs.  
The CNO responded with a letter that outlined the costs of various procurement options.  He 
also compared the operating and maintenance costs of the two ships in FY 2009 dollars.  He 
stated that because DDG 51 production was already phased out, there would be additional 
start up costs associated with reopening the production lines.  As a result, a single DDG 
Flight IIA would cost $2.2 billion and two DDG Flight IIAs produced at competing shipyards 
would cost $3.5 billion.  After these lead ships were procured, subsequent DDG 51s would 
cost $1.8 billion.  A subsequent DDG 1000, on the other hand, would cost $2.6 billion.  The 
CNO also laid out the differences in operating and maintenance costs63: 
Millions of FY 2009 
dollars 
DDG 1000 DDG 51 
Operating (steaming) 18.5 15.7 
Maintenance 10.3 5.6 
Manpower 8.5 19.9 
Total 37.3 41.2 
Crew Size 14 officers / 106 enlisted 24 officers / 272 enlisted 
Table 7.   Operating and Maintenance Cost Comparison of the DDG 51 and DDG 1000 
Destroyer (All numbers in billions of 2007 dollars) 
The CNO explained that the manpower cost savings achieved by the DDG 1000 
were largely offset by higher maintenance costs because the ship was significantly more 
complex.  His numbers also show no fuel savings costs from the IPS – in fact, steaming 
costs will rise with DDG 1000.  He also stated that the life cycle costs of the two ships 
were similar but did not provide a calculation.  In summary, the CNO’s numbers did 
show a significant decrease in DDG 1000 operating costs to offset its high procurement 
costs.64 
                                                 
63 Letter from ADM G. Roughead to the Honorable Edward M. Kennedy (May 7, 2008). 
64 Ibid.  
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 The truncation of the DDG 1000 program sent shockwaves through all 
stakeholders in the surface ship acquisition process.  The Navy has seen its reputation on 
Capitol Hill tarnished because of its inability to estimate cost and determine ship 
capability requirements.  Congress has shown that its failure to provide adequate 
oversight at key points led to dramatic cost overruns and unrealistic expectations.  
Industry has shown that its inability to deliver mature technologies on time and at or 
under budget leads to a drastic course correction by its most valued customers (U.S. 
Navy). 
 To make sense of recent events, it is important to examine exactly what happened.  
The Navy established a requirement in the mid 1990s for a land attack destroyer that 
could operate in the littorals and project power ashore.  Industry responded with dramatic 
warship designs that included new and exciting technologies that emerged in the recent 
technology boom.  Over time, new complex technologies were added resulting in major 
cost overruns.  The Navy, occasional victims of groupthink, defended DDG 1000 
rigorously and ensured Congress it was the surface combatant of the future.  Eventually, 
the Navy realized that the requirements of the 1990s were different from the requirements 
of today and came to the conclusion that DDG 1000 did not add enough capability to 
make it worth its tremendous cost.  The result was a scramble by the Navy, Congress and 
industry to reestablish requirements based on threats, protect the industrial base, and set a 
new shipbuilding course for the future.  
 The Navy must now take a hard look at itself and rethink methods used to 
establish and update requirements, program surface ships and take them through the 
acquisition process.  One lesson learned by the Navy is that it is never too late to make 
the right decision.  The enormous amount of monetary resources already spent on DDG 
1000 is a sunk cost and cannot be recovered.  Another lesson learned is that there is no 
sense in continuing a program that will not be able to meet emerging threats, even if the 
program has been supported by top officials for several years. 
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 In the end, the Navy deserves credit for re-evaluating the previous decision.  The 
recommendation to truncate the DDG 1000 program at two ships and reopen DDG 51 
production lines caused a stir, but will put the Navy in better position to take ownership 
of surface ship acquisition.  In a period of declining defense budgets and increasing 
global responsibilities the prudent choice of building a larger number of ships that meet 
current capability requirements to include operational and fiscal was paramount.  If the 
Navy did not reverse course, they risked the possibility being undercut by a new 
administration, a declining defense budget and a failing program.  They also risked 
spending large portions of their ship construction (SCN) account on a ship that is not able 
to meet emerging threats. 
 The DDG 51 is the backbone of the surface fleet because of its affordability and 
versatility.  The research shows the Navy is making the correct decision by trying to 
procure an additional eight DDG 51 Flight IIAs over the next five years.  The DDG 1000 
program, however, was not a waste of time or money.  The Navy will benefit from the 
large amounts of research and development that was done when it comes time to procure 
the next large surface combatant – possibly the CG(X).  Technologies such as the 
Integrated Power System, Automatic Fire Suppression System, Dual Band Radar and the 
tumblehome hull have the potential to change surface combatants forever.  In the end, 
however, it is important to remember the successes of the DDG 51 program – proven 
technologies, incremental upgrades, predictable cost structure and manageable risk.   
 37
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Cavas, C. P. (July 14, 2008).  DDG 1000 Destroyer Program Facing Major Cuts.  
Retrieved July 15, 2008 from 
<http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3626171>. 
 
Cavas, C. P. (October 6, 2008).  DDG 1000 Takes Another Hit-From JROC.  Retrieved 
October 7, 2008, from <http://www.defensenews.com.  
 
Cavas, C. P. (August 4, 2008).  Missile Threat Helped Drive DDG Cut:  Zumwalt Class 
Could Not Down Chinese Weapons.  Retrieved August 7, 2008, from < 
http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=3657972>.  
 
Congressional Budget Office Paper (U.S. Congress) Washington, D.C. (June 9, 2008).  
Resource Implications of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2009 Shipbuilding Plan.  
Defense Technical Information Center.  Retrieved June 9, 2008, from < 
http://cbo.gov/ftp-docs/93xx/doc9318/06-09-Shipbuilding_Letter.pdf>. 
 
Congressional Budget Office Testimony (July 19, 2005).  Statement of J. Michael 
Gilmore, Assistant Director for National Security before the Subcommittee on 
Projection Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on the Navy’s DD(X) 
Destroyer Program.  Retrieved July 21, 2008, from 
<http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/65xx/doc6561/07-19-NavyDDX.pdf>. 
 
Global Security.  Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD).  Retrieved October 10, 
2008, from <http:// www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/systems/aegis-
bmd.htm>. 
 
Global Security.  Aegis Combat System (ACS).  Retrieved October 10, 2008,  from < 
http://www.global-security.org/military/systems/ship/systems/aegis.htm>. 
 
Global Security.  DDG-51 Arleigh Burke – Flight I.  Retrieved October 10, 2008, from 
<http://www.global-security.org/military/systems/ship/ddg-51-flt1.htm>. 
 
Global Security.  DDG-51 Arleigh Burke – Flight II.  Retrieved October 17, 2008, from 
<http://www.glo-balsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ddg-51-flt2.htm>. 
 
Global Security.  DDG-51 Arleigh Burke – Flight IIA.  Retrieved October 17, 2008, from 
<http://www.glo-balsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/ddg-51-flt2a.htm>. 
 
Letter from Admiral G. Roughead to the Honorable Edward M. Kennedy (posted on 




O’Rourke, R. (October 28, 2004).  Navy DD(X) and LCS Ship Acquisition Programs:  
Oversight Issues and Options for Congress.  Congressional Research Service:  
The Library of Congress.  Retrieved October 24, 2008, from 
<http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL-32109_20041028.pdf>.  
 
O’Rourke, R.  (October 22, 2008).  Navy DDG-1000 and DDG-51 Destroyer Programs:  
Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress.  Congressional 
Research Service:  The Library of Congress.  Retrieved October 22, 2008, from < 
http://assets.open-crs.com/rpts/RL32109_20081022.pdf>. 
 
RAND Corporation (2006).  Acquisition and Competition Strategy Options for the 
DD(X): the U.S. Navy’s 21st Century Destroyer. 
 
Raytheon.  Zumwalt-Class Destroyer Critical Technologies:  Advanced Gun System 
(AGS).  Retrieved October 17, 2008, from < 
http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/pro-ducts/zum-walt/tech/index.html>. 
 
Schank, J. F., Smith, G. K., Birkler, J., Alkire, B., Boito, M., Lee, G. T., Raman, R., and 
Ablard, J.  (2006)  Acquisition and Competition Strategy Options for the DD(X):  
The U.S. Navy’s 21st Century Destroyer.  Santa Monica, CA:  RAND National 
Defense Research Institute.  Retrieved October 17 2008, from 
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/mono-graphs/2006/RAND_MG259.1.pdf>.  
 
Statement of Vice Admiral Barry McCullough, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for 
Integration of Capabilities and Resources before the Subcommittee on Seapower 
and Expeditionary Forces of the House Armed Services Committee on Surface 
Combatant Requirements and Acquisition Strategies.  (July 31, 2008).  Retrieved 




United States.  Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report to Congressional 
Committees.  (March 2008).  Defense Acquisitions:  Assessment of Selected 
Weapon Programs.   Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Government Accountability  Office.  
Retrieved October 17, 2008, from <http:// 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d08467sp.pdf>. 
 
United States.  Government Accountability Office (GAO).  (July 24, 2007).  Testimony 
before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, House Armed 
Services Committee by Paul L. Francis, Director Acquisition and Sourcing 
Management Team on Defense Acquisitions:  Realistic Business Cases Needed to 




INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California  
 
3. CDR William Hatch, USN, Ret 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
4. RADM James Greene, USN, Ret 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
5. Marine Corps Representative 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California  
 
6. Director, Training and Education, MCCDC, Code C46 
 Quantico, Virginia 
  
7. Director, Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, Code C40RC 
 Quantico, Virginia 
  
8. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (Attn: Operations Officer) 
 Camp Pendleton, California 
 
 
 
